D 651 
.U6 fl5 
1920 
Copy 1 




^morandum to the Government of the 
United States on the Recognition of 
the Ukrainian People's Republic. 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 
19 20 



Memorandum to the Government of the 
United States on the Recognition of 
the Ukrainian People's Republic. 



192 
PUBLISHED BY 

FRIENDS OF UKRAINE 

345 MUNSEY BUILDING 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 



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Gift 
PttbUeher 

. JUN fc 1920 



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UKRAINIAN MISSION 
Washington, D. C. 

May 12, 1920. 
The Honorable, The Secretary of State, 

Department of State, Washington. 
Sir: 

In view of the present status in eastern Europe, and 
in deference to the unsettled affairs of the territory of 
the former Russian empire, which are now pressing for 
a definite solution, I, as the representative of the Gov- 
ernment of the Ulcrainian People's Eepublic, conceive 
it to be my duty to submit for your consideration this 
memorandum setting forth the just claims of the 
Ukrainian people to political and economic indepen- 
dence. As a consequence of the facts herein explained, 
I respectfully ask the Government of the United States 
of America to extend recognition to the Ukrainian 
People's Republic as a free state. 

The national aspirations of Ukraine embrace politi- 
cal liberation for all Ukrainians, consolidation of all 
free Ukrainians into one state, the erection of a consti- 
tutional democratic republic, and economic co-opera- 
tion with neighboring and other states. 

Ukraine's claim to independence is based upon the 
following principal grounds : 

(1) The existence of the Ukrainians as a well-de- 
fined, separate, group-conscious race, with a continuous 
historic and cultural tradition ; 



(2) Their occupation, over a period of centuries, of 
the lands where they now dwell; 

(3) Their age-long efforts, increasingly of popular 
origin, to achieve and maintain political independence ; 

(4) The obvious interest and desire of the entire 
Ukrainian population to organize and sustain its 
economic life free of exploitation by neighbors and 
foreign powers ; and 

(5) The crying need for a new order in eastern 
Europe, and the permanent elimination of the historic 
struggle between Poland and Russia to control the 
natural resources of Ukraine. 

By all the canons of ethnology and history, the 
Ukrainians form a distinct racial unit. In America 
there has been a popular impression that Ukraine is 
merely a province of Russia, identified with, it linguis- 
tically and racially. This is a misapprehension. The 
leading anthropologists, even among the Russians, 
agree that the Ukrainians constitute a physical type 
clearly different from the Great Russians, the White 
Ruthenians or the Poles. In culture and temperament 
thej' display peculiarities which permeate their whole 
social and moral nature. Their language is a separate 
Slavic tongue, and not merely a dialect of the Great 
Russian. 

''Between Ukrainians and Russians," says Sir Don- 
ald Mackenzie Wallace, a learned student of Russia, 
''there arc profound differences of language, customs, 
traditions, domestic arrangements, mode of life and 
communal organizations. Indeed, if I did not fear to 
ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my 
Great Russian friends who have a pet theory, I should 
say that we liave here two distinct nationalities. . . . ' ' 

"The historic development," says the official state- 
ment of the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, 

4 



"contributed toward the creation of two nationalities: 
the Great Russian and the Ukrainian. The historic 
life of the two peoples failed to develop a common 
language for them. On the contrary, it really strength- 
ened those dialectic variances with which the ancestors 
of the Ukrainians, on the one hand, and those of the 
Great Russians, on the other, made their appearance in 
history. And, of course, the living Great Russian 
idiom, as it is spoken by the people of Moscow, Riazan, 
Archangel, Yaroslavl or Novgorod cannot be called a 
* Pan-Russian' language as opposed to the Ukrainian 
of Poltava, Kiev or Lviv (Lemberg)." 

The Ukrainian race is as nearly autocthonous as any 
in central or eastern Europe. A brief survey of his- 
tory shows that, for more than one thousand years, the 
Ukrainians and their forbears have continued to occupy 
approximately the same lands which they now inhabit, 
except for temporary recessions and re-colonizations 
caused by Mongol invasions. In the ninth century 
they were already settled in the vast and fertile plains 
and woodlands lying between the Carpathian Moun- 
tains and the Sea of Azov, and embracing the valleys 
of the Dniester, Pruth, Boh, Dnieper and Donetz. 

Organized government in Ukraine began with the 
ancient state of Kiev. The ascendancy of Kiev also 
marks the period of Ukraine's greatest political ex- 
pansion. From the ninth to the thirteenth century, 
Kiev was the center of the economic, intellectual and 
political life of eastern Europe, uniting the entire 
ethnographic Ukrainian territories. The name by 
which this state was known was ''Russ," taken from 
the name of the reigning dynasty. This term was later 
appropriated by the Great Russians. ''Because of the 
Byzantine commerce, learning and craft," observes 
the Polish historian Zakrzewski, ''Kiev, the 'mother of 



Russ cities,' was for the Poland of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries what Rome had been for earlier 
Germans." The French geographer Reclus notices 
that academies flourished at Kiev and Ostrog before 
the Great Russians o^vned a single high school, and 
draws attention to the fact that Russia, during the re- 
generative period of Peter the Great, received her 
teachers from Ukraine. 

The fall of Kiev and Ukraine's subsequent loss of 
autonomous statehood in the fourteenth century can 
only be ascribed to the old system of military conquest. 
The affairs of eastern Ukraine became confused and de- 
cadent through the constant Mongol pressure wiiich 
began in the thirteenth century. One hundred years 
later, part of western Ukraine also, weakened by fre- 
quent Tatar invasions, fell a prey to Poland, to wlioni 
she was a tempting prize because of her rich soil. 

The Polish conquest of Ukraine started in 1340 and, 
after thirty-five years of the bitterest warfare, the 
Poles succeeded in annexing an area of land approxi- 
mately coextensive with the present provinces of Kholni 
and Eastern Galicia. This they never succeeded in as- 
similating, in spite of the most tremendous efforts. 
Simultaneously Volhynia and other northern Ukrain- 
ian territories became confederated with Lithuania in 
order to gain protection against the Tatars. The mar- 
riage of the Lithuanian king to the Queen of Poland 
and the union of the two realms drew these Ukrainian 
lands also in 1386 into an informal union with the 
Polish empire which, in 1569, in spite of Ukrainian pro- 
tests, was made definite, and lasted until 1648. 

In that year the whole Ukrainian people rose, under 
the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, and put an end 
to this union, which was incompatible with their inter- 
ests and with their type of civilization. Then, antici- 



pating further Polish efforts to destroy the newly won 
independence of Ukraine, and menaced by other foes, 
particularly the Turks, then the strongest military 
power in eastern Europe, the Ukrainians concluded an 
agreement of confederation mth the Czar of Muscovy 
in 1654. It is interesting to recall that Khmelnitsky 
was expressly advised against this step by Oliver 
Cromwell, who declared that the Czar would never 
permanently recognize a free people. 

The most important clauses in the treaty of 1654 
guaranteed a freely chosen supreme head for the 
Ukrainian state, called a ''hetman"; the right to en- 
gage in diplomatic relations with other states, except 
Poland and Turkey, when the cognizance of the Czar 
was necessary; free trade with all foreign nations; the 
complete independence of the judicial system; the 
right to choose a leader for the army, over whom the 
*'hetman" had supreme control; and, lastly, the inde- 
pendence of the Ukrainian Church. 

Muscovy did not live up to these terms, and the re- 
sult was a succession of Ukrainian uprisings, directed 
now against Russia just as they had formerly been 
aimed at Poland. In the last quarter of the seven- 
teenth century, Russia and Poland made common cause 
and partitioned Ukraine, making the Dnieper the 
frontier between their two empires. The most import- 
ant rebellion against this last measure was that led by 
Mazeppa in 1709, which was quelled by Peter the Great. 
After the time of Mazeppa, Russia's policy of repres- 
sion was pursued openly and ruthlessly. Peter insti- 
tuted a supervision over the autonomous Ukrainian 
administration, vesting authority in Muscovite officers, 
through whose hands passed everything pertaining 
to the hetman's chancellery. In 1722 the power of the 
hetmans was cut down to nothing. In 1764 Catherine 
TI. abolished the office altogether. 

7 



Meanwhile, in order to assure possession of 
Ukraine, the Russian government was making every 
effort to assimilate the Ukrainian people. One step 
toward accomplishing this was the suppression of 
Ukrainian literature. In 1720 a special censorship 
over the publication of Ukrainian books was estab- 
lished in Kiev, In 1769 even the printing of Ukrainian 
primers was forbidden, and Russian text-books w^ere 
introduced in spite of the protests of Ukrainian edu- 
cators. 

Step by step, national feeling was stifled in Ukraine. 
In 1775, the ''Zaporogian Sitch," the last bulwark of 
Ukraine's autonomy, and the basis of the Ukrainian 
Army, was destroyed. In 1783 the peasants of 
Ukraine, free since 1648, when they had thrown off 
Polish domination, were again subjected by the Rus- 
sian government to serfdom in its most cruel form. 
Hundreds of thousands of free peasants and Cossacks, 
together w^th millions of acres of Ukrainian land, were 
distributed among the favorites of Catherine II. 

This measure had the effect of crushing the resist- 
ance to Russification among the Ukrainian nobility, 
and estranged them from the common people. The 
serfdom of the small farmer Avas so profitable for the 
gentry that the preponderance of the aristocracy be- 
came superfically Russian, Under pressure of Russian 
schooling, administration and military service, they 
adopted the Russian language and political ideas. To 
achieve this desirable result, the Muscovite govern- 
ment did not hestitate to persecute ruthlessly anything 
that could be held as a reminder of the republican 
regime in Ukraine. At the same time, an analogous 
Polonization of the upper classes was being carried 
out in w^estern Ukraine. The last quarter of the cen- 
tury witnessed a temporary eclipse of the Ukrainian 
spirit of nationalism. 

8 



The French Revolution released forces that had 
been imprisoned in the hearts and minds of the people. 
A wave of nationalistic feeling swept through Europe, 
bringing inspiration to the Slavs as well as to their 
western brothers. Every branch of the Slavic race 
awoke to a realization of its history, its traditions and 
its great men. The Ukrainians shared in this renais- 
sance. Between the revived nationalism and the spirit 
of democracy a natural alliance presently sprang up. 
Especially in the Dnieper district, there began an 
enthusiastic study of the country's history, and a peru- 
sal of old documents and popular traditions. The keen- 
est interest was manifested in everything pertaining 
to ethnography, philologj^ and popular culture. It was 
the tardy recognition of the people as guardians of 
national culture which did much to break down the lack 
of sympathy which had so long prevailed between the 
nobles and the lower classes. 

But the Ukrainian movement was confronted by a 
bitterly hostile Russophile bureaucracy. It is remark- 
able that Russo-Ukrainian policies should have re- 
mained so static from the time of Peter the Great on- 
ward, while a number of changes were taking place in 
Russo-Polish relations. Yet such was the case. The 
Ukrainian language was restricted time and again. 
Ukrainian economic life was hampered in several ways. 
The Ukrainian serfs, upon their liberation in 1861, had 
been granted smaller allotments than the Russian serfs. 
This resulted in overpopulation of the agricultural dis- 
tricts, emigration and a high death rate. The lack of 
schools made remote the possibility of improving farm- 
ing methods. Ukrainian industry suffered a set-back 
through the unfavorable tariff policies adhered to by 
the Russian government and by the fact that no banks, 
except those with central offices in Moscow or Petro- 
grad, were allowed to establish branches in Ukraine. 

9 



Nevertheless, the nineteenth century mtnessed a 
notable growth of Ukrainian national feeling. The 
early years of the century constitute the period of 
literary rebirth. Then followed the educational work 
among the common people. Private schools were or- 
ganized, and pamphlets and books were distributed. 
Cultural organizations were formed, and a pronounced 
interest in science was displayed. This entire revival 
so alarmed the Russian government that, in 1878, the 
Czar prohibited by ukase almost all publications in the 
Ukrainian language. Still, the literary impulse was 
not suppressed. It transferred itself to Eastern Gal- 
icia and Switzerland and, in spite of grave obstacles, 
succeeded in mnning for the Ukrainian a worthy place 
among Slavonic literatures. 

Side by side with the cultural advance, a political 
reawakening of the Ukrainian people was taking place. 
It was appreciated by the Ukrainians that political 
liberty for their land and race was expressly condi- 
tioned upon the overthrow of the Czarist government. 
Accordingly they bent their efforts in that direction. 
Ukrainians organized and took a leading part in the 
Decembrist uprising of 1825. In the subsequent revo- 
lutionary movement they were again prominent, and 
two-thirds of the leaders were natives of Ukraine. The 
events of March, 1917, were largely made possible by 
the Ukrainian regiments stationed in Petrograd, who 
refused any further allegiance to the Romanovs and 
became supporters of the newly created authorities. 
Later on, the Ukrainians were the first of the subject 
nations of the Russian empire to organize their own 
government. On November 20, 1917, Ukraine was 
proclaimed an independent nation by the Central Rada, 
the provisional Ukrainian parliament. The struggle to 
win recognition for this independence is still in prog- 
ress. 

10 



The expediency of Ukraine's claim to exist as a self- 
governing nation does not, however, rest merely upon 
racial, ethnological and historical bases. There are 
primary economic considerations which press for its 
admittance to the circle of free nations. 

The Ukrainian people inhabit a land 330,000 square 
miles in extent, with a population of 45,000,000. This 
territory is not merely abundantly self-supporting, 
but is, in fact, one of the richest areas on the earth's 
surface. Four-fifths of the entire extent lie within a 
belt of deep, black earth, which produces bounteous 
crops of wheat, barley, rye, oats, sugar-beets, fruit, 
tobacco and vegtables. Under the Ukrainian ethno- 
graphic territory lie mineral riches: coal, petroleum, 
iron, manganese, salt, phosphate, kaolin, graphite and 
many other substances of commercial value. 

In the normal pre-war period, Ukraine used to sup- 
ply about 5,000,000 tons of grain for export annually. 
Most of this was wheat. The last three years, par- 
ticularly 1919, have seen good harvests in Ukraine. At 
the present moment, when western Europe is unable 
to feed herself, Ukraine has an excess remaining from 
the crops of 1917, 1918 and 1919, to an amount of not 
less than 10,000,000 tons of different kinds of grain. 
Besides this, the country can guarantee a minimum, 
yearly export of 300,000 to 600,000 tons of sugar; 
9,000 tons of tobacco ; 17,000 tons of sugar-beet seeds ; 
and 10,000 tons of flax and hemp yarn. Besides these 
products, Ukraine used to export annually before the 
war : 65,000 tons of eggs ; 6,500 tons of raw hides ; 12,- 
000 tons of pork and dressed poultry; 9,000 tons of 
beef; 240,000 head of beef cattle; 15,000 head of 
horses; 130,000 hogs; and large quantities of wool, 
feathers and hops. 

In minerals, Ukraine may export in a short time as 

11 



much as 100,000 tons of manganese ore annually ; 500,- 
000 tons of iron ore ; and considerable amounts of phos- 
phates, salt and soda. With reorganization of trans- 
portational facilities, she can furnish from 6,000,000 
to 10,000,000 tons of coal and coke, as well as benzol 
toluol, anthracen phenol, naphthalin and other valuable 
coal tar derivatives; about 90,000 tons of coal tar; 
sulphuric acid, ammonium salts and many other raw 
and semi-manufactured products. 

The preceding enumeration of the physical resources 
of Ukraine shows how mistaken is the conception that 
Ukraine could not maintain an economic existence inde- 
pendent of Russia. If a country possessing such ex- 
traordinary natural advantages and wealth as Ukraine 
cannot stand alone, how can one justify the independ- 
ence of Italy, Greece, Poland, Jugoslavia, Finland and 
other European nations whose right to autonomy is 
not questioned, but whose natural endowments are 
far less favorable to economic freedom. 

The converse of the same proposition; viz., that 
Russia cannot live -without Ukraine, Avill not survive 
impartial criticism. Although it is quite clear that, 
in reasoning to this end, other interests than those of 
Ukraine supervene, it is nevertheless w^orth while to 
examine this point of view in order to expose its 
falsity. 

The three fundamental bases of opposition usually 
advanced are: (1) Ukraine is the granary of Russia 
and is necessary to Russia for a large part of her food 
supply; (2) Ukraine separates Russia from the Black 
Sea and Sea of Azov, thereby closing the outlet to 
the Mediterranean; (3) Ukraine possesses a supply 
of coal and iron which is necessary to Russia. 

The first objection is refuted by an examination of 
statistics. Figures for the years previous to the war 

12 



show consistently that Ukraine's exportations of cere- 
als to other parts of the Russian empire did not reach 
more than 10 to 15% of her total export; i. e., about 
36,000,000 bushels annually. Nearly all of this was 
destined for Poland, Lithuania and White Ruthenia. 
Russia proper never consumed more than a very small 
fraction of Ukraine's grain. She did not need it then 
and will not need it in the future. She is virtually self- 
sustaining in cereals, and the small surplus needed can 
readily be obtained from the fields of Siberia and the 
region of the Volga. 

The second allegation, that Russia needs the Ukrain- 
ian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, is 
readily disposed of by a reference to Russian maritime 
experience. The official Russian statistics of the traffic 
of merchandise by rail show no southern port which 
served as an outlet for the products of the territories 
situated north of the ethnic frontier of Ukraine, with 
the single exception of Rostov-on-the-Don. Novoros- 
seysk was the port used by the Ukrainian Cossacks of 
Kuban and the northern Caucasus. Up to the present 
time, Russia proper has depended almost exclusively 
upon the Baltic ports. By special treaties with the neAv 
Baltic states, Russia is assuring herself a continued 
use of their ports. There is no reason w^hy, if it should 
appear necessary and advisable, a similar conciliatory 
agreement with Ukraine could not arrange for a com- 
mon use of the Black Sea ports. 

With regard to Ukraine's coal resources, it is true 
that the Donetz basin furnished 70% of the total coal 
output of the former Russian empire, and the Donetz 
basin is mostly within the ethnographic limits of 
Ukraine. But it is also a fact that four-fifths of this 
coal was consumed in Ukraine itself, and that north- 
western Russia and the Baltic provinces never used 

13 



the coal from the Donetz basin, because it could not 
compete in price with English or German coal. 
Furthermore, northern and central Russia are well 
supplied with wood and peat, and with coal from the 
vicinity of Moscow. Ukraine has very little wood or 
peat, and the exhaustion of the Donetz basin for the 
sake of Russian industries would leave her without fuel 
resources. The Urals and Siberia, too, are supplied 
mth local coal, while in the Kuznetsky district in west 
Siberia are vast deposits, scarcely worked as yet be- 
cause of the lack of railway lines into Siberia. 

The iron fields of the Urals and of other provinces of 
Russia proper have not been extensively exploited, and 
before the war Ukraine did indeed furnish three- 
fourths of all the iron supply of the former Russian 
empire. But the beds of iron ore in Ukraine are not 
very large, and it would be erroneous to assume that 
they could adequately supply the needs of all Russia 
for any long period of time. In any case, it is safe to 
conclude that, if the metallurgical development of 
Russia is continued and her mines consistently worked, 
she mil be entirely able to get along without iron im- 
ports from Ukraine. 

Finally, there is no obstacle to permanent economic 
co-operation of Ukraine and Russia, and brisk commer- 
cial dealings between the two independent states. But 
political disentanglement is a first requisite. The 
richness of Ukraine has always made it a tempting 
region for exploitation by neighboring states. This is 
more than ever true today. If such exploitation is not 
to be carried on at the expense of and to the detriment 
of the Ukrainian people, a separate state organization 
is necessary to assume protection over their economic 
interests. 

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a free 

14 



Ukraine does not imply an economically isolated 
Ukraine. Constant traffic with friendly foreign powers 
is desired by all the Ukrainian political parties. 
Ukraine lacks machinery, capital and trained experts. 
The railroad question is of enormous importance. Be- 
fore the Revolution, all of the rail lines of Ukraine 
yielded considerable profits, especially those known as 
the Southwestern Railroads. But Russia did not see 
fit to use this income in the construction of further 
roads and, as a result, Ukraine possesses a very incon- 
siderable network of railroads : only about 11,115 miles. 
This is much less than the country needs. The war al- 
most completely wrecked and demoralized even this 
inadequate transportational system. The railroads 
must be rebuilt, and the insufficiently developed public 
highways must be improved and extended. The regula- 
tion of navigable rivers is another matter of great im- 
portance, and the vast available power possibilities of 
the rapids of the Dnieper and other streams must be ex- 
ploited. Central power stations must be erected, new 
methods introduced in mining, grain elevators built 
and agriculture, milling, sugar refining and other in- 
dustries given an upward impetus by the application 
of scientific management and fresh capital. 

Inability to contest the force of the foregoing historic 
and economic considerations has led certain foes of 
Ukrainian independence to make the assertion that the 
Ukrainian national movement is artificially stimulated 
and does not receive support from the masses of the 
population. This contention is controverted by the 
most obvious facts. For more than two years the 
UTkrainians have been actively fighting for their lib- 
erty, in spite of almost incredible obstacles. They have 
had no support from any foreign source in this strug- 
gle; they were attacked at one and the same time by 

15 



the Bolsheviki and anti-Bolsheviki ; they were block- 
aded: they were unable to secure ammunition or sani- 
tary supplies. Thej^ did not give up, because they re- 
alized that the question was one of life or death. No 
other nation in modern times has fought for its inde- 
pendence under such difficult circumstances, and none 
has expressed its desire for freedom more strongly. 
The plebiscite of blood is the most sincere evidence of 
the will to self-determination. 

However, prolonged and stubborn fighting has not 
been the only Avay in which the Ukrainian people have 
sho^vn their desire to be free. They have had several 
opportunities to manifest their wish in a more jjeace- 
ful and regular manner. Thus, the Central Rada, 
which represented all classes of Ukrainians, and in- 
cluded in addition representatives of the various non- 
Ukrainian nationalities in tlie land, proclaimed 
Ukraine's independence in 1917. AVhen, in December 
of the same year, the Bolshevik propagandists ques- 
tioned the representative character of the Central 
Rada, a general congress of the workers and peasants 
of Ukraine was called, and this congress, chosen after 
the Bolshevik method, made haste to affirm its support 
of the Central Rada by a vote of 2,000 to 70. Theie 
was also in 1917 a formal election of deputies to the 
All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Ukraine elected 
230 deputies in all. Of those, 75% or 175 members, 
were Ukrainian nationalists. 

After the overthrow of the pro-German Hetmaii 
Skoropadsky in 1918, and assumption of authority i)y 
the Directorate, even the Ukrainian communists de- 
clared themselves in favor of a free Ukraine and pro- 
tested to the Russian Soviet Government against its 
proposed invasion. Their protest went unheeded, and 
when the Russian Bolsheviki occupied Kiev and en- 

16 



deavored to impose their system upon Ukraine, they 
found no Ukrainians who were willing to co-operate 
with them. The result was a so-called "Ukrainian 
Soviet Government," which is in reality anything but 
Ukrainian. The head is a Roumanian, Eakovsky, and 
the regime is nothing but a local agency of the Moscow 
government. 

It is noteworthy that the Government of the Ukrain- 
ian People's Republic, headed by General Petlura, 
which I have the honor to represent, is the only gov- 
ernment which the Ukrainian people have been willing 
to support. On the other hand, they have revolted 
against all foreign invaders who have attempted to im- 
pose their own rule upon the Ukrainians. The 
Germans, the Bolsheviki and the forces of General 
Denikin all met with vigorous resistance. If now the 
Polish forces are in Ukraine and the population does 
not oppose them, it is because the Poles are acting in 
conjunction with the Ukrainian forces under Petlura, 
as their allies. 

It is also necessary to consider the opinion enter- 
tained in some circles that an independent Ukraine 
must ine^dtably fall under the influence of Germany 
and become a German outpost in eastern Europe. The 
reason generally advanced as a basis for this suspicion 
is that Ukraine concluded a separate peace with 
Germany in February, 1918, at Brest Litovsk. In this 
connection, it should be remembered that Roumania, 
too, concluded a separate peace with Germany. Yet 
Roumania has continued to be considered an ally of 
Germany's opponents, and it is everywhere recognized 
that she only negotiated with Germany because of the 
bitter fact that she was forced to do so. Ukraine was 
in far worse condition than Roumania when she con- 
cluded her peace with Germany. Roumania had at 

17 



least an organized state and a loyal army. Ukraine's 
government was in its infancy, its state organization 
was slight, and its army consisted chiefly of the rem- 
nants of the demoralized Eussian forces. The Ukrain- 
ian leaders were faced by several wars ; on the one hand 
by the war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey 
and Bulgaria ; and now on the other, by the new conflict 
with the Eussian Soviet Government. Under the cir- 
cumstances, Ukraine had to choose between submitting 
entirely to the Bolsheviki, in which case the country 
would be over-run by Germans anyway, or making any 
kind of outright peace ^\dth Germany and then hoping 
for the best. 

Subsequent events proved that Germany never had 
any interest in a permanently independent Ukraine. 
Toward the end of the war, she was in desperate need 
of foodstuffs. Today she wants, not merely foods, but 
also a new and fruitful field for banking, commercial 
exploitation and the sale of German goods. Germany 
has grown to consider eastern Europe as a natural 
market for her products. What she wants is a Greater 
Russia, whether it be Czarist, Bolshevist or Constitu- 
tional. Under the circumstances, it is more plausible 
to suspect the Germans of plotting to re-establish 
"Eussia, one and indivisible," than to regard them as 
friendly to a free Ukraine. 

At the present moment, the recognition of the 
Ukrainian People's Eepublic is a matter of inter- 
national expediency, because there can be no peace in 
eastern Europe as long as Ulvraine is subjected to any 
neighboring nation. Proposals to deal with the 
Ukrainian people as if they had no moral right to self- 
determination are an obvious contradiction to the 
principles enunciated by President Wilson at the time 
of America's entrance into the war against Germanv 



18 



and her allies. The attempt to carry them into effect 
can only result in continued unrest in eastern Europe. 
The relegation of all Ukraine to Russia would mean at 
best the arbitrary compulsion of the Ukrainians to a 
federation which, if advisable, should come at their 
own instance and of their own free will ; not because of 
outside pressure. At worst, it would renew their ser- 
vitude. The partition of the country between Poland 
and Russia will not only produce continued restless- 
ness and discontent within Ukraine itself, but will also 
continuously tempt Poland and Russia to make war on 
one another, in order to extend their respective spheres 
of influence. An independent Ukrainian state, on the 
contrary, would establish a balance of power in east- 
ern Europe, which must be regarded as the surest 
guarantee of peace in that portion of the world. 

The foregoing statement covers, in outline form, the 
main grounds upon which Ukraine bases her claim to 
independence. This memorandum is presented to you, 
Mr. Secretary, in the hope that the Ukrainian situation 
will be thoroughly examined, and it is my earnest belief 
that a careful study of Ukrainian affairs will sustain 
the request for recognition of the Ukrainian People's 
Republic which I have the honor herewith to submit. 

I am, my dear Sir, 

Your very obedient servant, 

Julian Batchinsky, 
D'lplomafic Representative of the 

Ukrainian People's Bepuhlic. 



19 



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